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Abstract 
Although optimal forms of supply chain contracts have been widely studied in the 
literature, it has also been observed that decision makers fail to make optimal decisions in 
these contract setups. In this research, we propose different approaches to improve the 
performance of supply chain contracts in practice. We consider revenue sharing and 
buyback contracts between a rational supplier and a retailer who, unlike the supplier, is 
susceptible to decision errors. We propose five approaches to improve the retailer’s 
decisions which are in response to contract terms offered by the supplier. Through 
laboratory experiments, we examine the effectiveness of each approach. Among the 
proposed approaches, we observe that offering free items can bring the retailer’s effective 
order quantity close to the optimal level. We also observe that the retailer’s learning trend 
can be improved by providing him with collective feedbacks on the profits associated 
with his decisions.  
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1. Introduction 
Supply chain contracts have been extensively studied by researchers. A large stream of research 
in this field considers a two echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier (seller) and a retailer 
(buyer) who sells a seasonal (fashion) product to a market with random demand. Due to usually 
lengthy production and distribution lead times (Fisher & Raman, 1996), the retailer has to decide 
about the order quantity (initial inventory level) long before the start of the selling season. Under 
this setup, the retailer faces a classical Newsvendor inventory problem. That is, if the retailer’s 
order quantity is less than the realized demand, the retailer faces with inventory shortage (unmet 
demand), while if the order quantity is more than the realized demand the retailer is left with 
unsold inventory, which should be discarded or salvaged with a very low price. The classical 
Newsvendor solution identifies the optimal order quantity which maximizes the retailer’s 
expected profit.  
In a simple wholesale price contract, the retailer faces all the risk and the wholesale price that 
maximizes the supplier’s profit causes the retailer to order a quantity less than the value that 
maximizes the channel profit (Spengler, 1950). To avoid this situation, the supplier can offer a 
contract in which she provides the retailer with proper economic incentives to order the quantity 
that maximizes the supply chain profit (a coordinating contract). In this research, we consider 
two types of coordinating contracts: revenue sharing and buyback. In a revenue sharing contract, 
the supplier offers a relatively low wholesale price but asks the retailer to share part of the 
revenue of every item sold. Revenue sharing contracts have been used successfully (among other 
industries) in the video-rental industry (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005). In a buyback contract, the 
supplier buys back any unsold item from the retailer with a price lower than the wholesale price. 
Buyback contracts are common practice in the publishing, software, and pharmaceutical 
industries (Padmanabhan & Png, 1995). In both contracts, the supplier shares part of the 
retailer’s risk of facing a random demand.  
Although the theoretical benefits of optimal Newsvendor solutions and coordinating 
contracts have been widely studied, it is also known that retailers fail to place the optimal order 
quantities in practice. Fisher & Raman (1996) and Corbett & Fransoo (2007) show industry 
evidence that managers’ inventory decisions systematically deviate from the optimal quantities. 
Fisher & Raman (1996) show that managers’ less-than-optimal production quantity, at a ski 
apparel manufacturer, resulted in a profit which was 60% less than their calculated optimal 
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profit. Corbett & Fransoo (2007) study inventory decisions of 51 small businesses. They show 
that the inventory decisions deviates from the optimal decisions calculated by a Newsvendor 
model. They show that the deviations are consistent with the prospect theory predictions.  
Almost all the research papers in this field have focused on finding how and why decision 
makers’ order quantities deviate from the optimal values (we will briefly review these papers in 
section 2). The more important question of how this deviation could be avoided, however, has 
received little attention in the existing literature. As an attempt to fill this gap, we explore 
possible ways through which we can improve the performance of a supply chain by inducing the 
retailer to choose order quantities close to the channel’s optimal order quantity. 
Here, we consider an ideal supplier whose decisions are rational and sets the parameters of 
the contract according to their theoretical optimal values. The retailer, however, is assumed to be 
prone to behavioral misjudgments and errors. Therefore, the order quantities chosen by the 
retailer can systematically deviate from the optimal values. The retailer’s suboptimal decision 
has a negative impact on his profitability as well as the supplier’s and the channel’s profitability. 
Hence, the supplier tries to design the contract terms or offer additional information to address 
the inefficiency in the retailer’s decision and increase her (and consequently channel’s) profit.  
We explore five approaches which could possibly improve the performance of a revenue 
sharing or buyback contracts. We first identify the concept or logic behind each approach and 
then verify its effectiveness through laboratory experiments. Three of these approaches concern 
the contract terms which the supplier offers the retailer. The other two approaches concern 
providing the retailer with additional information or feedback that might help him to make better 
decisions. In our first approach we consider a new type of contract which is a combination of 
revenue sharing and buyback contracts. The second approach examines the possibility that risk-
aversion is the source of suboptimal decisions. If this is the case, then a coordinating contract 
that is designed for a risk-averse (not a risk-neutral) retailer should result in an optimal order 
quantity. The third approach considers the offering of free items by the supplier. If the number of 
free items offered increases with the size of the order, the retailer might be encouraged to 
increase his order quantity. Moreover, these free items increase the number of items in the 
supply chain. In our fourth approach we examine the impact of providing the retailer with visual 
information about the nature of demand uncertainty. This could possibly discourage the retailer 
to follow shortsighted strategies such as demand chasing. In our last approach we provide the 
4 
 
retailer, in each decision round, with a new performance measure that shows the collective 
impact of last decision if the current order quantity were the decision for previous decision 
rounds as well. This new piece of information should also discourage the retailer to follow a 
demand chasing strategy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 presents the theoretical background of the problem, explains the general experimental 
setup, and shows the results of our benchmark experiments. Sections 4 to 8 present the five 
studies through which we explain and investigate the effectiveness of each of our approaches to 
improve the performance of the supply chain. Section 9 concludes the paper with a summary of 
our results. 
 
2. Related Literature 
In this research we study a two echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer, in 
which the retailer faces a classical Newsvendor problem. In a Newsvendor problem a decision 
maker, who faces a random demand for a single selling period, has to decide about the quantity 
(inventory level) he needs to order/manufacture before the beginning of the period. Optimal 
order quantity is a trade-off between overage and underage inventory costs (Arrow et al, 1951). 
In its basic form, the Newsvendor problem has an elegant solution which can be applied to many 
applications other than single period inventory problems (e.g. multi-period inventory problems, 
capacity selection, choice of staffing level, time should be allocated to a given task, etc.). A 
review of different extensions of this widely studied problem is beyond the scope of this paper. 
We refer the interested readers to Olivars et al (2005) and Qin et al (2011) for reviews of this 
literature.  
Although the elegant structure of the Newsvendor problem has let researchers develop 
analytical solutions for different variants of this problem, it has been known for a while that 
decision makers facing this problem deviate from the theoretical optimal solution in practice. 
Fisher & Raman (1996) and Corbett & Fransoo (2007) provide industry evidence for this 
deviation. These observations have attracted many researchers’ attention as to how and why this 
deviation occurs. There are many research papers that try to explore this behavior through 
laboratory experiments.  
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Schweitzer & Cachon (2000), in a set of laboratory experiments, observe that the subjects’ 
order quantity always fall between the average demand and the optimal value. That is, for a high 
profit margin product, for which the optimal order quantity is higher than the average demand, 
the subjects’ average order quantity is also higher than the average demand, but lower than the 
optimal value. For low profit margin products, for which the optimal order quantity is lower than 
the average demand, the subjects’ average order quantity is lower than the average demand, but 
higher than the optimal value. This behavior is known as “pull to center.” The authors attribute 
this behavior to ex post inventory error, anchoring, and insufficient adjustment. Through their 
experimental analysis, they rule out the influential impacts of other factors like risk aversion, loss 
aversion, prospect theory preferences, waste aversion, and stock-out aversion. Our research is 
different from Schweitzer & Cachon (2000) since we study coordinating contracts between a 
supplier and a retailer, while they study a single Newsvendor decision maker (retailer). Similar to 
their results, our subjects (retailers) demonstrate the pull to center behavior. We also rule out the 
influential role of risk aversion in retailers’ suboptimal decisions, which is similar to what they 
conclude (using a completely different method).  
Building on Schweitzer & Cachon’s (2000) model, Bostian et al (2008) use an adaptive 
learning algorithm to justify the pull to center behavior. Unlike Schweitzer & Cachon (2000), 
Bostian et al (2008) find that subjects’ average order quantity is very close to the mean demand 
in the first round of decisions. However, order quantities diverge from the mean demand in 
successive decision rounds. The authors’ adaptive learning model explains the pull to center 
behavior and shows that subjects respond to recent gains and losses. They also show that payoff 
insensitivity to order quantity in the vicinity of the optimal order quantity could not explain the 
pull to center behavior. One of the approaches that we propose in this paper (the collective 
feedback approach) is partly based on Bostian et al (2008) observation that subjects respond 
mostly to recent gains and losses.  
Using a model based on the quantal choice theory, Kremer et al (2010) show that decision 
makers’ random errors cannot be the main source of deviation from the optimal order quantity. 
They show that context dependent decision strategies such as anchoring, chasing, or inventory 
error minimizing play more influential roles. The conclusion that context dependent and 
systematic biases play the influential role in subjects’ suboptimal decisions (rather than their 
random errors) suggest that there should be ways to counter these systematic biases. In this 
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research, we propose approaches to work against these systematic biases and bring the supply 
chain profit close to its optimum level.  
Bolton & Katok (2008) study the impact of experience and feedback on the subjects’ 
behavior. The authors show that subjects’ decisions improve over the 100 rounds of decisions in 
their experiments. However, they report a very slow rate of improvement. They also show that 
restricting subjects’ decisions to 10 rounds of standing orders can improve the quality of 
decisions (they increased the number of order quantities to 1000 rounds in this experiment). 
Among other results, the authors show that limiting the number of options from 100 possible 
order quantities in each decision round to 9 or 3 options cannot improve the quality of decisions. 
Their other results include examining the impacts of providing the subjects with extra 
information such as the payoff for the foregone options or providing payoff statistics for different 
decision options at the beginning of the experiment. They show that none of the mentioned 
information and feedback can improve the outcome. 
Lurie & Swaminathan (2009) also use laboratory experiments to study the impact of 
feedback frequency on the quality of decisions in a Newsvendor problem. More specifically, 
they examine the performance of a Newsvendor when an order quantity decision is standing for a 
set of rounds and the profit feedback is provided at the end of each set of rounds. They show that 
the Newsvendor’s profit can increase with a decrease in feedback frequency. They also find that 
introducing costs to make changes in successive decisions does not improve the Newsvendor 
performance when the feedback frequency is high. The authors show when the feedback 
frequency is high, decision makers tend to limit their information access to the most recent set of 
presented data, hence, they are more prone to overreacting to noisy feedback. They also show 
feedback frequency plays a more influential role than decision frequency. Our collective 
feedback approach provides the subjects with a feedback similar to what Lurie & Swaminathan 
(2009) provide in their experiment with standing orders. As we show in section 8, our collective 
feedback does not have any of the practical limitations that exist when we use standing orders.  
Different types of supply chain contracts have been studied under different experimental 
settings. Keser & Paleologo (2004) and Loch & Wu (2008) study wholesale price contracts. 
Coordinating contracts are studied by Ho & Zhang (2008), Katok & Wu (2009), and Davis 
(2010). Two-part tariffs and quantity discount contracts are studied by Ho & Zhang (2009). 
Katok & Wu (2009) study buyback and revenue sharing contracts. Davis (2010) investigates pull 
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contracts (both wholesale price and coordinating). The common result in all these papers is that 
these contracts fail to coordinate the supply chain in experimental setups.  
Katok & Wu (2009) separate the interaction of suppliers and retailers by letting subjects play 
the role of retailers against computerized (fully rational) suppliers, or the role of suppliers against 
computerized retailers. In this way, they can avoid the fairness effect which appears when human 
retailers interact with human suppliers. They find that the way demand distribution is presented 
(framed) to subjects affects their decision quality. The authors also show that in a high demand 
situation, the retailer performs better under a buyback contract than under a revenue sharing 
contract. The difference, however, decreases and disappears with experience. Similar to Katok & 
Wu (2009), in this research, we separate the interaction of suppliers and retailers by asking 
subjects, who play the role of retailers, to respond to contracts offered by computerized 
suppliers.   
All the above-mentioned papers try to explain the reasons behind retailers’ suboptimal 
decisions, which lead to less-than-optimal profits for all parties. The existing literature, however, 
fails to address how we can improve these suboptimal decisions. To fill this gap, we try to 
identify approaches to improve the retailer’s order quantity decisions, which could lead to higher 
supply chain profits.  
Becker-Peth et al (2011), through laboratory experiments, study the performance of buyback 
contracts. They show a Newsvendor retailer responds differently to different contract parameters 
even if these parameters result in the same critical ratio1. They build a behavioral model that 
depends on the buyer’s anchoring to mean demand, loss aversion, and different valuation of 
income. The authors first estimate the parameters of the model through subjects’ responses to a 
wide range of contract parameters and then find a contract that could result in the channel’s 
optimal solution. They also show that the contract can be customized for each subject. Similar to 
our paper, Becker-Peth et al (2011) try to find a contract that results in an order quantity close to 
the optimal value. Their approach, however, cannot control the share of supplier’s profit from the 
total channel’s profit. Therefore, the supplier cannot aim for a target profit level when she offers 
a contract in this approach. A detailed review of experimental studies on other forms of contracts 
is beyond the scope of this paper. A recent review of this literature can be found in Katok (2011). 
                                                          
1
 The Newsvendor critical ratio is defined by (p-c)/p, where p is the unit selling price and c is the unit cost. 
Theoretically, the optimal order quantities of two Newsvendors are the same when the critical ratios are equal. 
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In one of our studies in this research, we consider the impact of offering free products by the 
supplier to induce the retailer to place higher order quantities. Through a series of experiments, 
Shampanier et al (2007) show people usually perceive the benefits associated with free products 
to be higher than what classical economics predicts. They attribute this behavior to people’s 
difficulty in mapping their utility. Hence, they are more inclined toward a free product since it is 
an option with no downside.  
  
3. Preliminaries 
3.1. Theoretical Background 
In this subsection, we describe our supply chain model and present the theoretical formulation of 
the basic contracts that governs the supply chain. The theory behind each approach (to improve 
retailer’s decisions) will be presented separately in the corresponding sections. We consider the 
supply chain of a seasonal product which consists of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier offers 
the retailer a contract that specifies the payment scheme between the supplier and the retailer. 
We will study three forms of contracts: (a) wholesales price, (b) revenue sharing, and (c) 
buyback. The retailer faces a random demand in each selling season. The distribution of this 
demand is common knowledge. Based on the received contract and the demand distribution, the 
retailer chooses how much to order from the supplier (the order quantity). Therefore, the retailer 
faces a classical Newsvendor problem. The optimal order quantity of a Newsvendor decision-
maker can be found from (Silver et al, 1998) 
* 1 u
u o
cq F
c c
−
 
=  
+ 
,                                                          (1) 
where 
uc  is the unit inventory underage cost, oc  is the unit inventory overage cost, and 
1(.)F −  
denotes the inverse of cumulative distribution function of random demand. We will show how 
the values of 
uc  and oc  can be identified in each contract type.  
We assume the demand is uniformly distributed between A and B, ( , )D U A B∼ . The retailer 
sells each unit of the product with a price p. The unit production cost for the supplier is c. The 
salvage-price of unsold items is assumed to be zero. This happens when the excess inventory 
cannot be carried to the next selling season (either because it is too costly or because the product 
expires). Considering these assumptions is a common practice in this field. Almost all the papers 
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that study either Newsvendor problem or supply chain contracts through experimental 
approaches use these assumptions to keep the problem parameters in their simplest form 
(uniform demand distribution, constant selling price and production cost, and zero salvage-
price). Considering the problem setup in its simplest form lets the researcher focus on decision 
maker’s basic behavioral errors. To be consistent with the earlier studies in this field, we use 
these assumptions too. Considering a uniform demand distribution, equation (1) can be rewritten 
as  
* ( ) u
u o
cq A B A
c c
= + −
+
.                                                      (2) 
Before presenting the optimal forms of the wholesale price, revenue sharing and buyback 
contracts, we want to identify the order quantity that maximizes the supply chain profit as a 
whole. This would be the order quantity chosen by a centralized decision maker who controls 
both the retailer and the supplier. For such a decision maker, the overage and underage inventory 
costs would be uc p c= −  and 0c c= . Replacing these values in (2), we can calculate the optimal 
order quantity for a centralized decision maker as 
( )c
p cq A B A
p
−
= + − .                                                      (3) 
This order quantity results in the maximum supply chain expected profit. Therefore, any contract 
that results in cq  coordinates the supply chain. For a coordinated supply chain (or equivalently 
for a supply chain with a centralized decision maker) the expected sales volume is (Cachon, 
2003) 
2
( )
2c c
B A p cES q q
p
 − −
= −  
 
.                                              (4) 
The corresponding supplier’s expected profit can be found from 
2
( ) (1 ) ( )
2S c c
B A p cE q p c q p
p
pi λ
  − −
= − − −  
   
.                                 (5) 
As we mentioned earlier, the transaction between the supplier and the retailer is defined by a 
contract which is offered by the supplier. In a wholesale price contract, the only payment 
between the two parties is the wholesale price, wsw , which should be paid to the supplier for each 
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unit of product ordered by the retailer.  The value of  wsw  that maximizes the supplier’s expected 
profit can be calculated from the following equation (Katok & Wu, 2009). 
2 / ( )
2 2
ws
p if p c pB B A
w c p B
otherwise
B A
> + −

= 
+ −
 
It is easy to verify that wsc w p< ≤ . The underage and overage inventory costs for this type of 
contract is u wsc p w= −  and 0 wsc w= . Replacing these values in (2), we can then calculate the 
retailer’s optimal order quantity in a wholesale price contract as 
( ) wsws
p wq A B A
p
−
= + − . 
Since wsc w< , it is easy to verify that ws cq q< . Therefore, a wholesale price contract cannot 
coordinate the supply chain, which means the supply chain expected profit under this contract is 
lower than the maximum achievable expected profit for the supply chain.  
One of the contracts that coordinate the supply chain is the revenue sharing contract. To 
provide the retailer with the proper incentive to choose an optimal order quantity, the supplier 
offers a low wholesale price 
rsw  which is smaller than her production cost, c. In return, the 
retailer has to pay the supplier r for any unit that the retailer manages to sell. In this way, the 
supplier shares the risk of overstocking with the retailer. The optimal wholesale price and shared 
revenue that coordinate the supply chain are (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005) 
(1 )
rsw c and r pλ λ= = − ,                                                 (6) 
where 0 1λ≤ ≤  is the percentage share of retailer from the total supply chain profit. We can then 
have a revenue sharing contract for each value of λ. In practice, the value of λ is determined by 
the relative power of the supplier and the retailer or retailer’s alternative opportunities. The 
underage and overage inventory costs for this type of contract is ( )u rsc p w r p cλ= − − = −  and 
0 rsc w cλ= = . Replacing these values in (2), we can then calculate the retailer’s optimal order 
quantity in a revenue sharing contract as 
( )
rs c
p cq q A B A
p
−
= = + − . 
Since the order quantity under a revenue sharing contract is equal to 
cq , the supply chain can 
achieve its maximum expected profit under this contract.  
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Another contract that can coordinate the supply chain is the buyback contract. In this 
contract, the supplier offers a wholesale price bbw  which is larger than the supplier’s production 
cost, c, but smaller than the retailer’s selling price, p. In addition, in order to share the risk of 
inventory overage, the supplier offers to buy back the retailer’s unsold products at a price b. The 
optimal wholesale and buyback prices that coordinate the supply chain are (Cachon & Lariviere, 
2005) 
(1 ) (1 )bbw p c and b pλ λ λ= − + = − .                                        (7) 
The underage and overage inventory costs for this type of contract is ( )u bbc p w p cλ= − = −  and 
0 bbc w cλ= = . Replacing these values in (2), we can then calculate the retailer’s optimal order 
quantity in a revenue sharing contract as 
( )bb c
p cq q A B A
p
−
= = + − . 
Therefore, a buyback contract can also achieve the maximum expected profit for the supply 
chain. 
3.2- Experimental Design 
We use laboratory experiments to investigate the effectiveness of the different approaches that 
we propose to improve the performance of revenue sharing and buyback contracts. In all these 
experiments, we assume the supplier’s production cost is 4c = , the retailer’s selling price is 
20p = , and the demand is uniformly distributed between 100 and 300 units, (100,300)D U∼ . 
This choice of p and c represent a high profit margin product, ( ) / 0.5p c p− > . Since the benefit 
of coordination is larger for high profit margin products (Katok & Wu, 2009), here we focus only 
on this type of products. Moreover, for a low profit margin product, subjects’ more than optimal 
order quantities (as Schweitzer & Cachon, 2000 show) can in fact increase the supplier’s profit. 
So, there is no incentive for the supplier to try to lower the order quantities to the supply chain 
optimal level. Using a cost structure that results in a high profit margin is consistent with all the 
papers that study coordinating contracts in a supply chain through laboratory experiments (Ho & 
Zhang, 2008, Katok & Wu, 2009, and Davis, 2010). 
In our experiments the subjects responded to the contracts offered by a (computerized) 
supplier. We assume the supplier is rational and risk-neutral. As a result, supplier’s decisions are 
always consistent with the theoretical optimal solutions. By letting human subjects (retailers) 
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interact with computerized suppliers, we can avoid fairness concerns (Katok & Wu 2009).  
This will let us focus on subjects’ behavioral error. For the revenue sharing and buyback 
contracts we always set the contract parameters such that the retailer’s theoretical share of total 
profit is 1/ 4λ = . This value of λ  let both parties benefit from the coordination. In the absence 
of fairness concerns (responding to computerized suppliers), the choice of λ  should not change 
subjects’ decision patterns. Katok & Wu (2009), for instance, arbitrarily choose 1/ 3λ = . 
All of our subjects were College of Management students at the University of Massachusetts, 
Boston. We conducted the experiments in different management classes. The instructors of 
selected courses let us run the experiments in their classes as a required class activity. We 
conducted the experiments in a mix of graduate and undergraduate classes in four semesters 
during academic years of 2010-11 and 2011-12. To ensure that the results from undergraduate 
and graduate classes were comparable, we conducted the experiment on simple revenue sharing 
contract in a graduate and in an undergraduate class. The results were statistically equivalent. 
Katok & Wu (2009) observe the same results about the equivalence of the responses from 
undergraduate and graduate students in their experiments. 
To incentivize students, we presented each experiment as a contest through which the 
students can find out how good they were at making decisions under an uncertain environment 
(random demand). In addition, we offered cash prizes ($40, $30, and $20) to the first three 
students with the best total performance. Subjects played the role of retailer’s purchasing 
manager who decided about the order quantities for different selling seasons (rounds). Therefore, 
each subject’s performance was measured by the retailer’s total profit after 50 rounds of decision 
making.  
At the beginning of each experiment session, the supply chain setup was explained to 
subjects using a PowerPoint presentation. The presentation, which usually took around 20 
minutes, included simple numerical examples and how the subjects can interact with the 
software. A summary of the numerical values of the experiment parameters was visible on top of 
the screen at all times during the experiment. After a subject chose the order quantity for each 
selling season (round), the demand realized (a draw from a uniformly distributed random 
variable). Then, this demand along with the profit for the selling season, the accumulated profit 
so far, the cost of overstocking, and the cost of under-stocking for that round were shown to the 
subject. Two graphs on the screen showed the history of decisions made (order quantities) 
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accompanied by the realized demand and the history of profits in previous rounds. A screenshot 
of the user interface can be found in appendix B. 
As a validation step and to ensure that our experimental setup is consistent with the existing 
results in the literature, we conducted a series of experiments to see if we can observe the pull to 
center phenomena2 which has been reported repeatedly in the literature. We conducted an 
experiment with a wholesale price contract which is comparable to a simple Newsvendor 
problem. We also conducted one experiment with a simple revenue sharing contract and one 
experiment with a simple buyback contract. The details of these experiments and their results are 
presented in subsection 3.3. We consistently observed the pull to center phenomena in all these 
experiments similar to what is reported by Schweitzer & Cachon (2000), Bostian et al (2008), 
Kremer et al (2010), Bolton & Katok (2008), Lurie & Swaminathan (2009) , Katok & Wu 
(2009), Becker-Peth et al (2011). We will also use the results of these experiments as 
benchmarks for the results of other experiments which investigate the effectiveness of our 
proposed approaches. 
Bolton et al (2012), through an experimental study, compare the decisions made by students 
with those made by experienced managers when they play the role of Newsvendor decision 
makers. The authors show managers exhibit ordering behavior similar to students, including 
biased ordering towards average demand. A similar result is reported by Katok et al (2008). 
These observations suggest experimental papers that rely on responses from students can provide 
useful insights about what we can expect from managers in practice.  
3.3- Benchmark Experiments 
We first conducted three experiments on wholesale price, simple revenue sharing, and simple 
buyback contracts3. The contract parameters and the sample sizes of these experiments are 
presented in table 1. Contract parameters are calculated based on the theoretical results in 
subsection 3.1 and the cost structure mentioned in subsection 3.2, with 1/ 4λ =  for the 
coordinating contracts. 
Our first three hypotheses verify the existing results in the literature under our experimental 
setup. They also work as benchmarks for our proceeding results. Hypothesis 1 verifies whether 
                                                          
2
 We decided to verify the presence of pull to center phenomena in our experiments since it is the basic behavior 
which defines how the retailer’s decisions deviate from the optimal order quantity.  
3
 Since we conducted different variations of revenue sharing and buyback contracts, we call the traditional 
versions of these contracts simple revenue sharing and simple buyback contracts. 
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the retailer’s decision deviates from the optimal theoretical value in a wholesale price contract. 
In analyzing the hypotheses, throughout this research, we use Wilcoxon rank sum test (Levine et 
al 2011, pp. 447-451). The unit of our analysis is the average order quantity of each subject, 
except when we want to investigate subjects’ learning pattern for which we use the average of 
subjects’ decisions in each round (see section 8). 
Hypothesis 1. The average order quantity placed by the retailer in the wholesale price contract 
will be 125. 
Contract Type Sample Size w r b 
Optimal 
Order 
Quantity 
Wholesale price 14 17.00 -- -- 125 
Simple Revenue sharing 14 1.00 15.00 -- 260 
Simple Buyback 20 16.00 -- 15.00 260 
Table 1 – Parameters of benchmark experiments 
Subject’s average order quantity in the wholesale price experiment is 178.8, which is 
considerably higher than the optimal value. Hence, we can strongly reject hypothesis 1 
( 0.001).p <  In hypothesis 2 we want to see if the coordinating contracts can improve the 
performance of the supply chain by increasing the retailer’s order quantity in comparison to that 
of the wholesale price contract.  
Hypothesis 2. The average order quantity of revenue sharing and buyback contracts will be 
higher than the average order quantity of wholesale price contract. 
Subjects’ average order quantities in simple revenue sharing and simple buyback 
experiments are 228.9 and 225.6, respectively. The differences between these order quantities 
and the average order quantity of the wholesale price contract are statistically significant. 
Therefore, the experiment results support hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 looks at the performance of 
the revenue sharing and buyback contracts. This hypothesis checks whether these contracts are 
able to coordinate the supply chain as it is promised by the standard theory. 
Hypothesis 3. The average order quantities placed by the retailer in both simple revenue sharing 
and simple buyback contracts will be 260. 
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The average order quantities under simple revenue sharing and buyback contracts are 
considerably smaller than the optimal value of 260. We can, therefore, strongly reject hypothesis 
3 ( 0.001)p < . These results confirm the known pull to center behavior. 
 
4. Approach 1: Combined Contract 
4.1. Theoretical Results 
Hypothesis 2 shows that revenue sharing and buyback contracts can indeed improve the 
performance of the supply chain, even if the improvement is not as much as the theory predicts. 
The idea behind this approach comes from the observation that each of these two contracts can 
individually improve the performance of the supply chain to some extent. So, an interesting 
question could be whether a combination of these two contracts could improve the performance 
even further? A combined revenue sharing and buyback contract is a contract in which the 
supplier offers a relatively low wholesale price and in return asks the retailer to share part of the 
revenue of the sold items. In addition, the supplier promises to buy back the unsold items at a 
price lower than the wholesale price.  
Cachon & Lariviere (2005) show buyback and revenue sharing contracts are theoretically 
equivalent. That is, they result in the same profits for the retailer and the supplier for any 
realization of the random demand. Although the literature reports the theoretical equivalence of 
the two contracts, they are always treated as two distinct contracts. Here, we show that these two 
contracts are the two ends of a spectrum of combined contracts as we defined above. 
Let wcom, rcom, and bcom be the wholesale price, shared revenue, and buyback price of a 
combined contract, respectively. As before, we denote the percentage share of the retailer from 
the supply chain profit with λ. It is not very difficult to verify that the overage and underage 
inventory costs of this contract are o com comc w b= −  and u com comc p w r= − − . Replacing these 
quantities in (2), we can calculate the optimal order quantity of the combined contract as  
( ) com comcom
com com
p w rq A B A
p b r
 
− −
= + −  
− − 
.                                         (8) 
As we can see, different combinations of contract parameters (wcom, rcom, bcom) result in different 
values for 
comq . However, for any chosen wholesale price, comw , if the supplier sets the values of 
the shared revenue and buyback prices as 
16 
 
(1 ) andcom com com comr p c w b w cλ λ λ= − + − = − ,                           (9) 
then equation (8) simplifies to  
( )com c
p cq q A B A
p
 −
= = + −  
 
.                                          (10) 
This means, for any chosen wholesale price, comw , the choice of shared revenue and buyback 
prices as identified in (9) coordinates the supply chain. From (9), it is evident that the chosen 
wholesale price cannot be larger than (1 ) p cλ λ− +  or smaller than cλ . That is, 
[ , (1 ) ]comw c c pλ λ λ∈ + − .  
Note that the combined contract turns into a pure revenue sharing contract if we choose the 
lowest range of wholesale prices, .comw cλ=  Similarly, the combined contract turns into a pure 
buyback contract, if we choose the highest range of wholesale prices, (1 )comw c pλ λ= + − . 
4.2. Experimental Results 
The idea behind this approach is that a contract which has the appealing features of both revenue 
sharing and buyback contracts might inspire more confidence in subjects and encourage them to 
place higher order quantities. This could be in spite of the theoretical results, which predicts the 
same order quantities for the family of combined contracts with the same value of λ. The 
following hypothesis is to verify this conjecture.  
Hypothesis 4. All the contracts in a family of combined contracts with the same value of λ 
results in the same average order quantity. 
To examine this hypothesis, we compare four contracts in a family of combined contracts with 
1/ 4λ = . We consider the two simple revenue sharing and buyback contracts from subsection 3.3 
as the two ends of the spectrum. We also consider the results of another two experiments with 
new combined contracts. One combined contract has 4.75comw = , which is closer to the revenue 
sharing end of the spectrum, and another with 12.25comw = , which is closer to the buyback end 
of the spectrum. The experiment parameters along with the observed average order quantities are 
shown in table 2. We compare the average order quantities of these four contracts pairwise. We 
could not find any significant difference between the average order quantities ( 0.05p >  in all 
cases). Therefore, we do not have enough evidence to reject hypothesis 4.  
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Contract Type Sample Size w r b 
Observed 
Ave. Order 
Quantity 
Simple Revenue sharing 14 1.00 15.00 -- 228.9 
Combined 1 18 4.75 11.25 3.75 227.5 
Combined 2 18 12.25 3.75 11.25 226.1 
Simple Buyback 20 16.00 -- 15.00 225.6 
Table 2 – Parameters and results of combined contract experiments 
Katok & Wu (2009) observe differences between simple buyback and simple revenue sharing 
average order quantities in their experiments. They observe that depending on the demand range 
and the way it is framed for the subjects, the buyback contract can result in higher or lower 
average order quantities. They attribute this observation to subjects’ loss aversion behavior. 
Their results, however, show that the difference between the average order quantities of the two 
contract types decreases and disappears with subjects’ experience. This means that in general 
subjects do not react to different forms of combined contracts. Therefore, using a combined 
contract is not an effective approach to induce suppliers to place higher order quantities.  
 
5. Approach 2: Risk Averse Contract 
5.1. Theoretical Results 
The results of our benchmark experiments show that retailers tend to order less than the optimal 
order quantity in both revenue sharing and buyback contracts. Katok & Wu (2009) observe 
similar results. One possible explanation for retailer’s less-than-optimal order quantity could be 
retailer’s risk-averse behavior. It has been long argued that decision makers in the business world 
tend to be risk-averse. Eeckhoudt et al (1995) show that the optimal order quantity decreases 
with an increase in risk-aversion in a Newsvendor problem. If risk-aversion is the reason behind 
the less-than-optimal order quantity, then the supplier should be able to rectify this problem by 
designing contracts not for a risk-neutral but for a risk-averse retailer. 
To model retailer’s risk-aversion, we consider an exponential utility function for the retailer, 
i.e. ( ) xu x e φ−= − , where φ is the constant risk-aversion coefficient. The following proposition 
characterizes the optimal parameters of a revenue sharing contract for a risk-averse retailer.  
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Proposition 1. A coordinating revenue sharing contract for a retailer with a utility function of 
( ) xu x e φ−= − is characterized by the wholesale price ˆ
rsw  and shared revenue rˆ , where the 
shared revenue is the unique solution to  
ˆ( )( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ1 ( )( )c
c S c c c
p r q A
c c
p r B q p r E q rES q cq
e p r B q qφ
φ pi
φ− −
− − − − +
=
− + − −
,                      (11) 
and the wholesale price can be calculated from 
ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ
S c c c
rs
c
E q rES q cq
w
q
pi − +
= ,                                             (12) 
where ( )S cE qpi  and ( )cES q  can be found from (4) and (5).  
Moreover, for a retailer with a risk-aversion coefficient of φ, the optimal order quantity, qφ , 
under a revenue sharing contract with wholesale price w and shared revenue r is the unique 
solution to  
( )( ) 1 ( )( )p r q A p re p r w B q
w
φφ
φφ− − −= + − − − ,                                (13) 
The proof of this and other propositions can be found in Appendix A.  
5.2. Experimental Results 
To design a revenue sharing contract for a risk-averse retailer, we first need to find the value of 
risk-aversion coefficient φ. We can estimate the value of φ from the results of our benchmark 
experiments. In other words, we can numerically solve equation (13) for φ with 228.9qφ = , 
1w = , and 15r = . The result will be 0.0022φ = . This value shows the level of risk-aversion that 
theoretically results in an order quantity of 228.9 (our observed average order quantity under a 
simple revenue sharing contract).  
Knowing the risk-aversion coefficient, we can then use (11) and (12) to design a revenue sharing 
contract for our risk-averse subjects. We conducted an experiment with such a revenue sharing 
contract. The parameters of this contract and the subjects’ average order quantity are shown in 
table 3. We can see that for a risk-averse retailer, the supplier should lower the wholesale price 
and in turn increase the shared revenue. Hypothesis 5 verifies the performance of a revenue 
sharing contract that is designed for a risk-averse retailer. 
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Hypothesis 5. The average order quantity of a revenue sharing contract that is designed for a 
risk-averse retailer ( 0.0022φ = ) will be 260. 
Contract Type Sample Size w r 
Observed 
Ave. Order 
Quantity 
Simple Revenue Sharing 14 1 15 228.9 
Risk Averse Revenue sharing 17 0.42 15.77 228.0 
Table 3 – Parameters and results of risk-averse revenue sharing experiments 
The result of our experiment does not show any improvement in the average order quantities 
and there is still a large gap between the observed average order quantity and the optimal value. 
We can then strongly reject hypothesis 5 ( 0.001p < ). This means risk-aversion does not play an 
influential role in the subjects’ behavior in a revenue sharing contract and hence we cannot use it 
to improve the contract performance. Since we did not find any influential impact of risk-
aversion, we did not repeat a similar experiment for a buyback contract. 
Schweitzer & Cachon (2000) look at the possible impact of risk-aversion on subjects’ 
behavior too. In their experiments they examine a simple Newsvendor problem (not contracts 
between suppliers and retailers). Their observation, however, is consistent with ours. They 
conclude risk-aversion cannot play an influential role in Newsvendor’s pull to center behavior. 
They use the contrast between the subjects’ behavior when they face high profit margin and low 
profit margin products to draw this conclusion.  
 
6. Approach 3: Offering Free Items 
6.1. Theoretic Results 
To provide the retailer with more incentive to increase the order quantity, we consider forms of 
revenue sharing and buyback contracts in which the supplier offers one free unit of product to the 
retailer for any N products ordered. Offering free items could have two impacts on the 
performance of the supply chain. First, it increases the effective order quantity, which we define 
as the sum of actual order quantity and free items, (1 1/ )effq q N= + . Second, the lure of 
receiving free items (Shampanier et al, 2007) might encourage the retailer to increase his order 
quantity. These increases mean the total number of items in the supply chain can get closer to the 
optimal level.  
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Once a free item is delivered to the retailer, it is treated similar to a regular paid item. That is, 
in a revenue sharing contract, the retailer has to share the revenue of all sold items (free and 
paid). Similarly, in a buyback contract, the supplier buys back all unsold items (free and paid). 
This condition is required to keep the percentage share of the supplier in the contracts with free 
items similar to her percentage share in simple coordinating contracts (see the proof of 
proposition 2). The following proposition characterizes the coordinating contracts with free 
items. 
Proposition 2. When the supplier offers one free item for every N items ordered by the retailer, 
coordinating contracts are characterized by 
(a) revenue sharing contract: (1 1/ )F
rsw N cλ= +  and (1 )Fr pλ= − , 
(b) buyback contract: (1 1/ )[(1 ) ]Fbbw N p cλ λ= + − +  and (1 )Fb pλ= − . 
Moreover, in these two contracts, the percentage share of the supplier from the total channel 
profit is (1−λ).  
Proposition 2 states that in a coordinating contract with free items, the supplier maintains the 
same shared revenue and buyback price as in the case of a simple coordinating contract. 
However, to make up for the cost of free items, the supplier has to increase the wholesale price. 
Note, from a theoretical point of view, simple coordinating contracts and the corresponding 
contracts with free items perform equivalently. That is, the latter results in the same expected 
profit for the supplier and the retailer as the former. However, for a retailer who is prone to 
behavioral error and misjudgment, the two contracts might perform differently.  
6.2. Experimental Results 
Hypotheses 6A and 6B verify the effectiveness of revenue sharing and buyback contracts with 
free offerings.  
Hypothesis 6A. The average effective order quantity of a revenue sharing contract with free 
offering (N=7) will be 260. 
Hypothesis 6B. The average effective order quantity of a buyback contract with free offering 
(N=6) will be 260. 
We chose the values of N based on the subjects’ average order quantities in simple revenue 
sharing and buyback contracts (benchmark experiments) in a way that the number of free items 
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brings the effective order quantity to a level close to the optimal value (260). This means N=7 for 
the revenue sharing contract and N=6 for the buyback contract. We conducted two experiments 
for revenue sharing and buyback contracts with free items. In these experiments the monetary 
value of free items received by the retailer is presented to the subjects after they entered their 
order quantities in each round. In our instructions we emphasized that this monetary value turns 
into profit only when the retailer manages to sell them. The parameters and results of these 
experiments are shown in table 4. 
In the revenue sharing experiment, the actual average order quantity (221.3) remains almost 
the same as the order quantity in the simple revenue sharing experiment (228.9). There is no 
significant difference between the two values ( 0.05p > ). As a result, the effective order 
quantity, 252.7effq = , becomes very close to the optimal value (no significance difference, 
0.05p > ). Therefore, we cannot reject hypothesis 6A. In other words, offering free items in a 
revenue sharing contract can bring the effective order quantity to a coordinating level.  
Contract Type Sample Size w r b N 
Ave. Order 
Quantity 
Actual 
Ave. Order 
Quantity 
Effective* 
Revenue Sharing 
• Simple 14 1.00 15.00 -- -- 228.9 228.9 
• With Free Items 17 1.14 15.00 -- 7 221.3 252.9 
• With Adjusted 
Free Items 17 
Initially 1.14 
then adjusted 15.00 -- 
Initially 7 
then adjusted 221.4 258.9 
Buyback 
• Simple 20 16.00 -- 15.00 -- 225.6 225.6 
• With Free Items 19 16.79 -- 15.00 6 202.1 235.8 
• With Adjusted 
Free Items 19 
Initially 16.79 
then adjusted -- 15.00 
Initially 6 
then adjusted 209.1 249.6 
*
 Effective order quantity = Actual order quantity + Free items 
Table 4 – Parameters and results of contracts with free items 
It is interesting to note that the actual average order quantity is statistically equivalent to that 
of a simple revenue sharing contract. It seems that, in this experiment, the tendency to order 
more because of free items is cancelled out by the tendency to order less because of a slightly 
higher wholesale price. As a result, the extra free items can coordinate the supply chain. In the 
case of buyback contract with free items, the subjects’ actual average order quantity (202.1) is 
significantly ( 0.01p < ) less than the average orders in a simple buyback contract (225.6), which 
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in turn means that the effective average order quantity, 235.8effq = , is significantly less than the 
optimal value (260). This means that the offering of free items in the buyback contract does not 
work similar to the revenue sharing contract. This could be due to the fact that in the buyback 
contract the amount of increase in the wholesale price is higher than the similar increase in a 
revenue sharing contract (considering the same value of N). This is because, in the revenue 
sharing contract, part of the revenue of the sold free items returns to the supplier. Therefore, the 
supplier needs to increase the wholesale price only by a small amount. This is not the case in the 
buyback contract. Therefore, the supplier has to increase her price by a larger amount to keep her 
expected profit similar to a simple buyback contract. As a result, the tendency to increase the 
order quantity to receive more free items cannot balance the tendency to reduce the order 
quantity because of higher wholesale price. Hence, offering free items cannot coordinate the 
supply chain and we can strongly reject hypothesis 6B ( 0.001p < ). 
To improve the performance of this form of contract, we can customize the contract terms for 
each individual subject. We will see that this approach can significantly improve the 
performance of both contracts. In this approach (adjusted free), we try to tailor the value of N for 
each subject. That is, instead of choosing one value of N for all subjects, we use a separate value 
of N for each subject based on the subject’s history of orders. Through the following two 
hypotheses we investigate the performance of revenue sharing and buyback contracts with 
adjusted free items. 
Hypothesis 7A. The average order quantity of a revenue sharing contract with adjusted free 
offering will be 260. 
Hypothesis 7B. The average order quantity of a buyback contract with adjusted free offering 
will be 260. 
To verify these two hypotheses we conducted two experiments (a revenue sharing and a 
buyback contract) with free items in which the value of N for each subject is adjusted after the 
first 25 rounds based on the average of each subject’s order quantities in in the first 25 rounds. 
The wholesale prices were also changed according to the new values of N. The new values of N 
and wholesale price after the first 25 rounds were highlighted on the screen to attract subjects’ 
attention.   
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The results of the experiments are quite interesting. In the revenue sharing contract, the value 
of N adjusts from 7 to an average of 11.2 after the 25th round. Note that the higher the value of N 
the fewer the number of free items in the supply chain. The resulting effective average order 
quantity of the second 25 rounds increases to 257.8 .effq =  For the buyback contract, the values 
of N adjusts from 6 to an average of 8.3 after the 25th round. The effective average order quantity 
of the second 25 rounds increases to 249.6 .effq =  In both contracts, there is no significant 
difference between the effective order quantities and the optimal values. Therefore, we cannot 
reject hypotheses 7A and 7B ( 0.05p > ). The adjusted values of N suggest (again) that we need 
fewer numbers of free items in the revenue sharing contract than what we need in the buyback 
contract.  
Note that the improved performance in the second half of the experiment with the adjusted 
number of free items cannot be associated with a learning process in the subjects’ ordering 
behavior. This is due to the fact that the actual order quantities in the adjusted free experiments 
remain almost the same as the actual order quantities of the experiments with the fixed number 
of free items. Therefore, the improvement can only be due to the adjusted number of free items. 
We will have more discussion about subjects’ learning in section 8. 
 
7. Approach 4: Showing the Demand Pattern 
One of the reasons behind subjects’ suboptimal decisions is argued to be subjects’ focus on the 
most recent demand which could in turn lead to a demand chasing pattern (Schweitzer and 
Cachon 2000, Bostian et al, 2008, and Lurie & Swaminathan, 2009). Subjects’ focus on the most 
recent demands could be due to their inability to comprehend the true nature of demand 
uncertainty. In our benchmark experiments we informed the subjects about the demand 
distribution. This is the case in almost all other similar research papers. This information, 
however, might not effectively be involved in the subjects’ decision making process.  
The idea behind our fourth approach is to provide visual information about the demand 
pattern to help the subjects to better understand the random nature of the demand and discourage 
them to chase the demand. The following hypothesis investigates the impact of providing visual 
information about the demand pattern. 
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Hypothesis 8. The average order quantity of a revenue sharing contract with additional (visual) 
information about the demand pattern will be 260. 
In an experiment with the revenue sharing contract, we added a graph on the software user-
interface. The graph showed a sample history of demand in 50 consecutive selling seasons 
(rounds). Figure 1 shows such a graph. This graph was visible throughout the experiment. All 
other conditions were the same as our benchmark experiment.  
The resulting average order quantity (228.3) is almost the same as the average order quantity 
in the simple revenue sharing contract. We can, therefore, strongly reject hypothesis 8
( 0.001)p < . This means, trying to create a better understanding about the demand behavior, 
through visualizing the demand pattern as shown in figure 1, cannot improve the quality of 
retailer’s decisions. Since the pull to center phenomena still prevails, there can be only two 
explanations for this observation. Either subjects’ lack of comprehension of the demand behavior 
is not the main source of subjects’ suboptimal decisions, or being exposed to the visual demand 
pattern, as shown in figure 1, is not enough to create a better comprehension of demand 
behavior. Either way, the results of this experiment suggest that the subjects’ attentions still 
remain on the last realized demand and the inventory error that it creates. This means showing 
the demand pattern in not an effective approach to improve subjects’ decisions. 
 
Figure 1 – Visualization of demand pattern (uniform distribution) 
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8. Approach 5: Providing Collective Feedback 
Both Bolton & Katok (2008) and Lurie & Swaminathan (2009) show that the performance of a 
Newsvendor can be improved by restricting a decision to stand for a set of rounds. That is, when 
the retailer makes a decision in a selling season (round), then the same decision is applied to a set 
of successive selling seasons. The result of this decision (feedback) is revealed to the retailer 
only after all these selling seasons are over.  
Standing order reduces the frequency of orders. Therefore, the subjects know that each order 
quantity decision impacts more than one round. This could encourage them to look at the random 
demand in a more collective way, which in turn might reduce their tendency for demand chasing. 
On the other hand, standing orders reduce the feedback frequency too. Hence, each feedback 
contains the collective impacts of an order quantity on the profit of more than one realized 
demands. This collective measure, in a sense, reduces the randomness in demand and show a 
more accurate value of each order quantity. The experiments by Lurie & Swaminathan (2009) 
suggest the improvement in a standing order setup is mainly due to a reduction in feedback 
frequency (not due to a reduction in order frequency). 
Although standing orders can result in average order quantities that are closer to the optimal 
value, it has the practical limitation of preventing the retailer to place an order for each selling 
season. It has also the limitation of preventing the retailer to access the result of a decision at the 
end of each season. Hence, applying standing orders might not be practical in many business 
situations.  
To address these restrictions, we propose a new approach. In this approach, after a subject 
makes an order quantity decision, he is presented with the total profit that would be earned if the 
chosen order quantity were chosen for all previous rounds. Therefore, this would-be total profit is 
similar to an imaginary total profit of a standing order from the beginning of the experiment 
(using the current order quantity). For example, if a subject chooses an order quantity of 230 in 
the 20th round, then the would-be total profit will show the total profit if 230 were the chosen 
order quantity for all the first 20 rounds. As a result, this would-be total profit provides a 
feedback in every round which is very much similar to the feedback provided in a regular 
standing order. In the new approach, however, the retailer does not face the limitations of a 
standing order. That is, the retailer can make a decision for every round and access the feedback 
at the end of each round. 
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The value of this would-be total profit is negligible in the starting rounds of the experiment. 
However, as the number of rounds increases, the value of information provided by this number 
also increases. In other words, in the higher rounds, this would-be total profit (and its comparison 
with the actual total profit) is a good measure for the real value of the selected order quantity. 
Since the decision maker usually focuses on the feedbacks of the latest round, this piece of 
information should be under retailer’s attention range. As a result, we can expect a learning 
pattern in the retailer’s decision process and observe better decisions toward the final rounds. 
Through the following two hypotheses we try to verify this conjecture. 
Hypothesis 9A. The average order quantity of a revenue sharing contract with would-be total 
profit feedback will be 260. 
Hypothesis 9B. The average order quantity of a buyback contract with would-be total profit 
feedback will be 260. 
We conducted two experiments for the revenue sharing and buyback contracts while 
providing the would-be total profit feedback. To make sure that the subjects fully understood this 
new piece of information, we asked them to write a sentence or two about the meaning of the 
would-be total profit before they started making their order quantity decisions. All other 
experimental conditions were the same as our benchmark experiments.  
Before we examine hypothesis 9A, we use linear regression to verify if there is an increasing 
trend in subjects’ average order quantities. We find a significant increasing trend (0.58 units per 
round, 0.001p < ) in the revenue sharing experiment. Figure 2 shows the average order 
quantities across the 50 rounds of our experiment. Such an increasing trend does not exist in the 
simple revenue sharing (benchmark) experiment. This lack of considerable learning trend in 
simple contracts is consistent with the prior research papers. Schweitzer & Cachon (2000) do not 
observe a learning trend in their Newsvendor experiment with 15 rounds of decisions. Bolton & 
Katok (2008) observe a learning trend in the Newsvendors’ decisions in their extended 
experiment with 100 rounds of decisions. However, they report a very low rate of increase in the 
average order quantities (0.13 units per round). 
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Figure 2 – Average order quantities with would-be total profit feedback (revenue sharing) 
Considering the learning trend in the revenue sharing experiment with the would-be total 
profit feedback, we verify hypothesis 9A for the last 10 rounds of the experiment to observe the 
impact of the learning process. The parameters and results of our experiments are presented in 
table 5. It is evident that the average order quantity (last 10 rounds) of the experiment with the 
would-be total profit feedback (239.1) has increased significantly ( 0.05p < ) compared to the 
corresponding value for a simple revenue sharing experiment (214.8). Although average of the 
last 10 rounds is still short of the optimal value (260), the difference is not statistically significant 
( 0.05p > ). So, we do not have enough evidence to reject hypothesis 9A. This learning trend 
suggests that, in a revenue sharing contract, the retailer could eventually choose order quantities 
very close to the optimal value when he is provided with this type of feedback. 
The result of the buyback experiment with the would-be total profit feedback does not show 
any learning pattern. The regression analysis shows no significant slope in the average order 
quantities placed by the subjects through the 50 rounds of the experiment. The comparison of the 
last 10 rounds of this experiment with the corresponding value for a simple buyback contract 
does not show any improvement either (see table 5). We can, therefore, strongly reject 
hypothesis 9B ( 0.001p < ). 
It is interesting to observe that the same type of feedback results in different outcomes in the 
revenue sharing and buyback contracts. In this approach, the subjects respond more positively to 
the collective feedback in the revenue sharing than what we can see in the buyback contract. One 
possible explanation could be the fact that in the buyback contract the higher wholesale price 
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means a higher initial payment (hence a higher prospect of loss). This prospect of loss could 
encourage the decision maker to focus more on the last demand value and not on the collective 
feedback. This behavior could be attributed to subjects’ loss-aversion (Katok & Wu, 2009). 
 
Contract Type Sample Size w r b 
Ave. Order 
Quantity     
(last 10 rounds) 
Revenue Sharing  
• Simple  14 1.00 15.00 -- 214.8 
• Would-be total profit 18 1.00 15.00 -- 239.1 
Buyback 
• Simple 20 16.00 -- 15.00 221.1 
• Would-be total profit 15 16.00 -- 15.00 225.3 
Table 5 – Parameters and results of contracts with would-be total profit feedback 
 
9. Concluding Remarks 
In this research, we examine a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a rational supplier and a 
retailer who is prone to behavioral errors. We show (like others before us), when the supplier 
offers a coordinating contract (either revenue sharing or buyback), the retailer systematically 
fails to place an order with optimal quantity. This sub-optimal behavior, in turn, results in less-
than-optimal profits for all parties and the supply chain as a whole. 
We contribute to the existing literature by proposing five approaches to improve the 
decisions made by the retailer. We verify the effectiveness of each approach through laboratory 
experiments. The first three approaches concern the contract terms offered by the supplier. These 
approaches are (1) combined contracts, (2) contracts designed for risk-averse retailers, and (3) 
contracts with free-item offering. Among these approaches, we show, only the contracts with 
free-item offering can actually bring the order quantities close to the optimal level and coordinate 
the supply chain. The next two approaches concern extra information and feedback for the 
retailer. These are (4) providing the visual pattern of demand randomness and (5) providing a 
collective feedback on each decision. We show that the collective feedback (would-be total 
profit) can create a stronger learning process in the revenue sharing contract, which means 
decision makers can learn from their prior decisions and eventually place close-to-optimal order 
quantities. This approach is not effective in the buyback contract.  
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A general takeaway from this research is that it is possible to improve the results of decisions 
made by the retailer either through a contract mechanism or through carefully designed feedback. 
It is interesting to note that the two effective approaches that we find in this research improve the 
performance of the contract in two very different ways. The free-item approach (or its adjusted 
counterpart) does not improve the retailer’s decisions. Instead, it adds a proper number of items 
to the items ordered by the retailer. Therefore, it increases the total number of items in the supply 
chain. The required change in the wholesale price is so small that it does not change the decision 
maker’s ordering behavior. Hence, the resulting total number of items (effective order quantity) 
increases to a number very close to the optimal order quantity.  
On the other hand, the collective feedback approach improves the retailer’s decisions by 
weakening the demand chasing behavior. One of the reasons behind the retailer’s suboptimal 
decisions is argued to be the decision maker’s limited attention span. Having a limited attention 
span, the decision maker mostly focuses on the feedback from the latest decision which is either 
a shortage or excess of inventory. This shortsightedness results in the demand chasing behavior. 
Providing a collective feedback (the potential impact of a decision on all previous selling 
seasons) can help the decision maker to overcome the tendency to chase the random demand. 
The collective feedback, in fact, shows a more realistic value of each decision in each selling 
season. 
It is also interesting to note that these two approaches are less effective on Buyback 
contracts. The reason behind this behavior can be attributed to the decision makers’ loss aversion 
behavior (Katok & Wu, 2009). In a buyback contract the wholesale price is higher than the 
wholesale price in a revenue sharing contract. In the free-item approach, higher initial wholesale 
price means that the price increase due to offering free items is more noticeable by the decision 
maker. Therefore, the retailer tends to order fewer items to reduce the risk of loss due to 
inventory overage. Similarly, in the collective feedback approach, when the wholesale price is 
high, the risk of loss due to inventory overage attracts the decision maker’s attention. This 
prevents the retailer from paying enough attention to the collective feedback. Therefore, the 
demand chasing behavior prevails.  
This research also contributes to the supply chain contracting literature by introducing 
theoretical forms of three new contracts, which are extensions of revenue sharing and buyback 
contracts. These are (a) revenue sharing contracts for risk-averse retailers, (b) combined 
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contracts (combination of revenue sharing and buyback), and (c) revenue sharing and buyback 
contracts with free items. For each type of contract, we derive contract parameters that 
theoretically coordinate the supply chain.  
Having the results of this research, it would be interesting to explore the possible approaches 
that can improve other forms of contracts (such as two-part tariffs and quantity discount) in 
practice. This could be a possible avenue for future research.  
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Appendix A: Proofs 
Proof of proposition 1: The order quantity which maximizes the expected utility of the retailer 
can be calculated as follows. 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
q p r D wq if D Q
q
q p r w q if D Q
pi
pi
pi
−
+
= − − ≤
= 
= − − >
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q B
A q
Eu q u q f x dx u q f x dxpi pi pi
− += +∫ ∫  
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )1( ) ( )q p r x wq p r w qAEu q e dx e B qB A φ φpi − − − − − −= − − −− ∫  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )p r A wq p r w qp r w qEu q w e e p r w e B q
q B A p r
φ φφpi φ− − − − − −− − −∂  −  = − − − − −  ∂ − − 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) 0 ( ) ( )p r A wq p r w qp r w qEu q w e e p r w e B q
q p r
φ φφφ φφ
φ
pi φ− − − − − −− − −∂  = ⇒ − = − − −  ∂ −  
( )( ) 1 ( )( )p r q A p re p r w B q
w
φφ
φφ− − −= + − − −                                   (A1) 
Now, for a given risk aversion coefficient φ, we want to find a new revenue sharing contract 
ˆ ˆ( , )
rsw r that can result in the same order quantity and supplier’s expected profit that risk neutral 
retailer generates with ( , )w r , that is  
( )c
p r wq A B A
p r
− −
= + −
−
       and      
2
( ) ( )
2S c c
B A p r wE q w r c q r
p r
pi
 − − −
= + − −  
− 
. 
In designing ˆ ˆ( , )
rsw r , we know the value of cq  that we want to achieve therefore we can 
calculate the value of w from equation (A1) for given values of φ and rˆ . 
ˆ( )( )
ˆ ˆ( )( )( )
ˆ
ˆ1 ( )( )c
c
rs p r q A
c
p r B q p r
w
e p r B qφ
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                                            (A2) 
On the other hand, supplier’s expected profit under the contract ˆ ˆ( , )rsw r  can be written as: 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )S c rs c cE q w c q rES qpi = − + ,  where 
2
( )
2c c
B A p r wES q q
p r
 − − −
= −  
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Therefore, ˆ
rsw can be calculated as follows: 
ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ
S c c c
rs
c
E q rES q cq
w
q
pi − +
=                                                        (A3) 
By equating equations (A2) and (A3) we can calculate rˆ . Then we can replace this value to 
either (A2) or (A3) to calculate ˆ
rsw . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Let (1 1/ )q N q= + . Then, the retailer’s profit for a revenue sharing contract can be written as: 
( ) 1 1/
( ) ( )
1 1/
R
wp r q if D qp r q wq if D q N
p r D wq if D q wp r D q if D q
N
pi
 
− − ≥ 
− − ≥  + 
= = 
− − < 
− − <
 +
 
This is similar to a retailer’s profit in a simple revenue sharing contract in which the wholesale 
price is /(1 1/ )w N+  and the shared revenue is r. Therefore, the parameters of a coordinating 
revenue sharing contract with free items can be related to the parameters of a coordinating 
simple revenue sharing contract as follows.  
(1 1/ ) (1 1/ )F
rs rsw N w N cλ= + = +       and        (1 )Fr r pλ= = −  
The channel expected profit can be written as 
cE pES qcpi = − , 
where ES is the expected sales. Supplier’s expected profit can be written as 
(1 ) (1 1/ ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )F Fc rs CE r ES w q cq pES N cq cq pES qc Epi λ λ λ λ λ pi= + − = − + + − = − − − = − , 
 
Similarly for a buyback contract we have: 
( )
1 1/
( ) ( )
1 1/
R
wp q if D q
pq wq if D q N
wpD wq b q D if D q p b D b q if D q
N
pi
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This is similar to a retailer’s profit in a simple buyback contract in which the wholesale price is 
/(1 1/ )w N+  and the buyback price is b. Therefore, the parameters of a coordinating buyback 
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contract with free items can be related to the parameters of a coordinating simple buyback 
contract as follows.  
(1 1/ ) (1 1/ )[(1 ) ]Fbb bbw N w N p cλ λ= + = + − +       and        (1 )Fb b pλ= = −  
Supplier’s expected profit can be written as 
( ) (1 1/ )[(1 ) ] (1 ) [ ]
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
F F
c bb
C
E w q b q ES cq N p c q p q ES cq
pES qc E
pi λ λ λ
λ λ λ pi
= − − − = + − + − − − −
= − − − = −
, 
Appendix B: User interface of the experimental software 
 
 
